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Abstract: Can the perception that one’s partner is investing effort generate a sense of 
commitment to a joint action? To test this, we developed a 2-player version of the classic 
snake game which became increasingly boring over the course of each round. This enabled us 
to operationalize commitment in terms of how long participants persisted before pressing a 
‘finish’ button to conclude each round. Our results from three experiments reveal that 
participants persisted longer when they perceived what they believed to be cues of their 
partner’s effortful contribution (Experiment 1). Crucially, this effect was not observed when 
they knew their partner to be an algorithm (Experiment 2), nor when it was their own effort 
that had been invested (Experiment 3). These results support the hypothesis that the 
perception of a partner’s effort elicits a sense of commitment, leading to increased persistence 
in the face of a temptation to disengage.   
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From assembling furniture to painting houses and playing games, joint action is a pervasive 
and important feature of human sociality. Joint action can be defined as ‘any form of social 
interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to 
bring about a change in the environment’ (Sebanz et al., 2006: 70; Butterfill, 2012). While 
many other species also participate in forms of joint action, such as birds flocking (Pulliam, 
1973), fish schooling (Katz et al., 2011) and chimpanzees hunting (Boesch, 2002), it has been 
argued that humans are uniquely able and motivated to coordinate their actions, and do so 
more flexibly and in a wider variety of contexts than other species (e.g. Melis & Semmann, 
2010; Konvalinka et al., 2010; Tomasello, 2009; Silk, 2009). This enables us to achieve 
outcomes we could not otherwise achieve, and to do so more efficiently than we otherwise 
could (Melis, 2013; Tomasello, 2009). 
 However, our predilection for joint action also presents us with the challenge of 
determining when and to what extent we should persist in contributing to joint actions when 
we may individually be tempted to stop. While it may be superfluous to persist longer than 
one wants to in joint actions that are unimportant to one’s partner or indeed that one’s partner 
may herself abandon, it could be damaging to one’s reputation and to one’s relationships to 
disappoint the expectations of a partner to whom the continuation of a joint action is highly 
valuable (Heintz et al., 2015). But how does one distinguish the former sort of case from the 
latter sort? Following Michael, Sebanz and Knoblich (2015; 2016), we hypothesized that the 
motivation to remain engaged in joint actions and to resist tempting alternative options and 
distractions is governed by an implicit sense of commitment which is modulated by the 
amount of effort that one’s partner has invested in the joint action. Imagine, for example, that 
you have agreed to attend a cocktail party at your colleague’s apartment but, on the occasion, 
find yourself tired or otherwise tempted to leave after only a short time. If your colleague has 
obviously invested a great deal of effort in preparing the hors d’oeuvres and decorations, you 
might find that a sense of commitment leads you to stick around for a few hours after all. 
If this is correct, then we should expect people’s persistence in a joint action to be 
modulated by the amount of effort which they perceive their partner(s) to have invested. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we developed a 2-player version of the classic ‘snake game’ in 
which the participant controls the left-right axis while their partner (an algorithm) controls the 
up-down axis. In Experiment 1, participants were led to believe that their partner was a person 
whom they had met in the waiting area, and that, before each round of the snake game, the 
partner had to perform a cognitive task in order to ‘unlock’ the round. The cognitive task 
consisted in deciphering a captcha, which could be either difficult (High Effort condition) or 
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easy (Low Effort condition). Then, the participant and the partner retrieved as many apples as 
possible by jointly controlling the snake. Since the apples appeared at an ever-slowing rate, 
each round became progressively boring, generating an incentive to disengage. Participants 
were instructed to press a ‘finish’ button whenever they determined that it was time to move 
on to the next round. This enabled us to operationalize commitment in terms of how long 
participants persisted in each round. We predicted that participants would feel more 
committed to the joint action in the High Effort condition than in the Low Effort condition, 
and that they would therefore persist longer before pressing the ‘finish’ button in the High 
Effort condition than in the Low Effort condition. 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that participants were correctly 
informed that their partner was an algorithm. If any effect observed in Experiment 1 does 
indeed reflect the operation of an implicit sense of commitment that is engaged by the 
perception of others’ efforts being invested in a joint action, then we should not expect 
participants to differentiate between the High Effort condition and the Low Effort condition 
when they do not believe that there is any agent investing effort at all.  
Experiment 3 was designed to test an alternative explanation, namely that participants 
may persist longer in the High Effort condition due to sunk cost reasoning, i.e. they may 
persist longer in order to ensure that the effort invested by their partner ‘pays off’ (Staw, 
1976; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). To this end, we instructed participants to perform the cognitive 
tasks themselves in order to unlock each round. We reasoned that if increased persistence in 
the High Effort condition is due to sunk cost reasoning, then we should observe the same 
pattern in Experiment 3.  
 
Experiment 1 
 
Participants 
Using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) we determined that a sample size of twenty-six would 
provide 80% statistical power for detecting a medium-sized effect equivalent to what we 
observed in a pilot study (d= .58), assuming a two-tailed t-test and an alpha level of .05. Our 
stopping rule was therefore as follows: we continued recruitment until twenty-six participants 
had completed the number of trials which we determined a priori to mark the minimum 
threshold (as explained below). In addition to these twenty-six participants who constitute our 
sample (19 females; age range: 18-29, M = 23.04, SD = 2.67), eight further participants did 
not meet the minimum threshold and were excluded prior to analysis. All participants were 
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recruited from student organizations in the Budapest area, were naïve to the purpose of the 
study, and reported normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants signed informed 
consent prior to the experiment, and received gift vouchers for their participation. The 
experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved 
by the (EPKEB) United Ethical Review Board for Research in Psychology. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The experiment was displayed on a 13-inch computer screen (resolution: 2560 x 1600 pixels, 
refresh rate:  60 Hz). The program for the experiment was written in Python (Peirce, 2007), 
with a framerate of 17 frames per second. 
The algorithm for the partner, which controlled the up-down axis, was programmed to 
behave in a human-like manner: it follows the shortest path to the apple, but sometimes 
(randomly) makes mistakes, reacting too late or turning in the wrong direction. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were first introduced to a person in the waiting area (a confederate), whom they 
were told would be their partner for the experiment, and who would be playing in the adjacent 
room. They were informed that their task, together with their partner, would be to collect as 
many apples as possible over the course of 20 rounds by jointly maneuvering the snake, with 
the participant controlling the left-right axis, and the partner controlling the up-down axis.  
In addition, they were informed that they and their partner had each been randomly 
assigned an additional task. Their partner would have the additional task of solving a captcha 
before each round in order to unlock the round. The captchas would sometimes be easy (Low 
Effort condition) and sometimes difficult (High Effort condition), as depicted in Figure 1. 
The participant would have the task of determining when it was time to conclude each round 
of the snake game, and move on to the next round, by pressing the spacebar. The easy 
captchas (Low Effort condition) consisted of 3 characters and were deciphered in 4 seconds, 
while the difficult captchas (High Effort condition) consisted of 12 characters and were 
deciphered in 16 seconds. The videos which participants viewed of captchas being deciphered 
can be found in the Supplementary Material (See S1). The captcha before the practice round 
was of intermediate length (8 characters), taking 12 seconds to decipher.  
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Fig. 1. Sample Captchas. In the instruction phase, participants were presented with examples 
of easy and difficult captchas. 
  
In a within-subject design, the experiment consisted of 20 trials in total, 10 in the High 
Effort condition and 10 in the Low Effort condition (See Figure 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Trial Structure. Each trial consisted of a captcha phase, followed by a round of the 
snake game. In the captcha phase, a video was presented in which stars progressively 
appeared to indicate that the partner was solving a captcha, and finally the completed captcha 
key was displayed (See S1 in the Supplementary Material). This unlocked a round of the 
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snake game, which the participant initiated with a key press. Each round continued until the 
participant pressed the spacebar to ‘finish’ the round.  
 
To make the joint action increasingly boring, apples were programmed to appear at an 
ever-slowing rate within each round. In the first 10 seconds, each new apple appeared 
immediately. After 10 seconds, new apples appeared with a delay of 40 frames; this delay was 
doubled every ten seconds.   
The experiment was preceded by one practice trial. The captcha for the practice trial 
was of intermediate length between the captcha for the High and Low Effort conditions (8 
characters), and took 12 seconds to decipher. 
 
Results 
For the analysis, we excluded the data from participants who did not complete at least 16 
trials (8 in each condition) within the scheduled time slots. We also excluded the data from 
trials on which participants collected 0 apples (0.77% of the data). There was a high degree of 
variability in persistence times across trials, with participants persisting as long as 25 minutes 
on some trials. Since we had no a priori basis for setting any particular upper bound, we did 
not exclude any of these longer trials. Instead, we elected to use individual participants’ 
median persistence times as the basis for our analyses. In order to test the data for normality 
and homogeneity of variance we conducted a Shapiro-Wilk test, which revealed a significant 
deviation from normality, p=0.004. We therefore performed a log10 transformation on the 
data to meet the assumption of normality. We then conducted a paired-samples t-test, which 
revealed significant difference between conditions, with participants persisting longer in the 
high effort condition (M=85.51, SD= 28.65; logtransformed M=1.910, SD=0.137) than in the 
low effort condition (M=78.29, SD= 25.34; logtransformed M=1.873, SD=0.137), t(25)=2.42, 
p=0.023, Cohen's d= 0.475 (See Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
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Fig. 3. Persistence for High and Low Effort conditions. Error bars represent the within-subject 
confidence intervals (following the method proposed by Cousineau, 2005; cf. Loftus & 
Masson, 1994). Symbols indicate significance level (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ns= 
non-significant). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Individual Data. Each dark circle represents one participant’s median persistence 
for each of the two conditions: the median persistence for the High Effort Condition lies on 
the Y axis, while the corresponding median persistence for the same participant in the Low 
Effort Condition lies on the X axis. The identity line indicates where each participant's dot 
would lie if her or his median persistence did not differ between conditions. 
 
Discussion 
The results corroborate the prediction that participants would persist longer on rounds of the 
snake game in the High Effort condition than on rounds in the Low Effort condition, despite 
the increasing boredom resulting from the decreasing rate at which apples appeared. 
However, these do not conclusively demonstrate that it was the perception of their partner’s 
effort that led participants to persist longer. An alternative explanation is that participants 
might have persisted longer in the High Effort condition because they themselves had to wait 
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longer while their partner solved the captcha. If so, the effect may be a function of 
participants’ own investment of time rather than their partner’s investment of effort.  
Experiment 2 was designed to test this alternative explanation. To this end, we 
correctly informed participants that the role of their partner in the snake game would be 
played by an algorithm, and otherwise repeated the same procedure as in Experiment 1. We 
reasoned that if the alternative explanation is correct, we should predict longer persistence in 
the High Effort condition even if participants do not believe that their partner is a real agent, 
and we should therefore observe the same pattern as in Experiment 1. In contrast, if the effect 
observed in Experiment 1 indeed reflects the operation of an implicit sense of commitment 
that is engaged by the perception of a partner’s effortful contribution, we should not expect 
participants to differentiate between the High and Low Effort conditions when they do not 
believe that there is a real agent investing effort. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Participants 
Our stopping rule was the same as in Experiment 1.  In addition to the twenty-six participants 
who made up our sample (18 females; age range: 20-37, M = 23.81, SD = 3.73), six further 
participants were excluded prior to analysis because they did not finish the minimum number 
of trials.  Participants were recruited from student organizations in the Budapest area, and 
received gift vouchers for their participation. All were naïve to the purpose of the study, 
reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and signed informed consent prior to the 
experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
and was approved by the (EPKEB) United Ethical Review Board for Research in Psychology. 
 
 
Procedure 
We implemented the same procedure as in Experiment 1, with the exception that we correctly 
informed participants at the outset that their partner was an algorithm. 
 
Results 
For the analysis, we employed the same procedure as in Experiment 1. First, we excluded the 
data from participants who did not complete at least 16 rounds (8 in each condition) in the 
scheduled time slots. Next, we also excluded trials on which participants collected 0 apple 
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(0.77 % of the data). We then conducted a paired-samples t-test, which revealed no significant 
difference in persistence between the high effort condition (M=99.09, SD=50.85; 
logtransformed M=1.943, SD=0.220) and the low effort condition (M=98.09, SD=52.14; 
logtransformed M=1.937, SD=0.221), t(25)= 0.52, p=0.606, Cohen's d= 0.102 (See Figure 
3). 
 
 
Discussion 
The absence of any difference between the High and Low Effort conditions in Experiment 2 
is difficult to reconcile with the alternative explanation which Experiment 2 was designed to 
test, namely that participants persisted longer in the High Effort condition of Experiment 1 
because they themselves had had to wait longer for their partner to solve the captcha. 
Experiment 3 was designed to probe the possibility that participants’ increased 
persistence in the High Effort condition of Experiment 1 may have been a product of sunk 
cost reasoning, whereby participants persist longer in order to ensure that the previously 
invested effort ‘pays off’ (Staw, 1976; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). To test this, participants in 
Experiment 3 were instructed to solve the captchas themselves to unlock each round of the 
snake game. If the sunk cost explanation is correct, then we should expect to observe the same 
pattern as in Experiment 1. In contrast, if participants’ increased persistence in the High Effort 
condition of Experiment 1 was due to a sense of commitment to their partner, then we should 
not expect longer persistence in the High Effort condition than in the Low Effort condition of 
Experiment 3. 
  
Experiment 3 
 
Participants 
Our stopping rule was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. In addition to the twenty-six 
participants who made up our sample (18 females; age range: 19-40, M = 23.41, SD = 3.93), 
nine further participants were excluded prior to analysis because they did not finish the 
minimum number of trials. For recruitment, we used the participant database at the University 
of Warwick (UK), where the experiment was conducted. All participants were naïve to the 
purpose of the study, reported normal or corrected to normal vision, and signed informed 
consent prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Humanities & Social Sciences Research 
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Ethics Sub-committee (HSSREC) at the University of Warwick. Each participant received £6 
for participating. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The captchas which participants were instructed to solve before each round of the snake game 
are included in the Supplementary Material (See S3). 
 
Procedure 
We implemented the same procedure as in Experiment 1, with the exception that participants 
solved the captchas themselves before each round of the snake game. 
 
Results 
For the analysis, we employed the same procedure as in Experiments 1 and 2. First, we 
excluded the data from participants who did not complete at least 16 rounds (8 in each 
condition) in the scheduled time slots. Next, we also excluded trials on which participants 
collected 0 apple (0.19 % of the data). We then conducted a paired-samples t-test, which 
revealed no significant difference in persistence between the high effort condition (M=82.68, 
SD=32.62; logtransformed M=1.883, SD=0.182) and the low effort condition (M=85.32, 
SD=35.42; logtransformed M=1.891, SD=0.195), t(25)= 0.55, p=0.588, Cohen's d= 0.108 
(See Figure 3). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The absence of any difference between the High and Low Effort conditions in Experiment 3 
is not consistent with the alternative explanation which Experiment 3 was designed to test, 
namely that participants’ longer persistence in the High Effort condition of that experiment 
was due to sunk cost reasoning. This is because, if sunk cost reasoning had been driving the 
increased persistence in the High Effort condition of Experiment 1, then it should also do so 
when it is the participant herself who invests the effort. In contrast, the absence of any 
difference between conditions in Experiment 3 is consistent with the hypothesis of a sense of 
commitment that is elicited by the perception of a partner’s effort. 
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General Discussion 
 
Our results reveal that participants’ persisted longer at an increasingly boring joint action 
when they perceived what they believed to be cues of their partner’s effortful contribution 
(Experiment 1). Crucially, this effect was not observed when they knew their partner to be a 
algorithm (Experiment 2), nor when it was their own effort that had been invested 
(Experiment 3). Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that the perception of a 
partner’s effort can elicit an implicit sense of commitment to joint action, leading to increased 
persistence in the face of a temptation to disengage (Michael, Sebanz and Knoblich 2015; 
2016). Such a mechanism may play an important role in managing one’s relationships and 
one’s reputation, because a partner’ investment of effort indicates that the continuation of a 
joint action is likely to be valuable to her, and that she may therefore be disappointed if one 
disengaged (Heintz et al., 2015).  
 The findings reported here raise interesting new questions for further research. In 
particular, it would be important to investigate the role of coordination in mediating the 
effects of a partner's effort upon commitment to a joint action. Previous research has shown 
that coordination can enhance rapport (Bernieri, 1988; Hove & Risen, 2009) and trust 
(Launay et al., 2013; Mitkidis et al., 2015), and lead to cooperation in social dilemmas 
(Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009; Van Baaren et al., 2004) as well as pro-social helping behavior 
(Kokal et al., 2011; Valdesolo & Steno, 2011). It would therefore be reasonable to speculate 
that the effect of perceived effort observed in the present study may have been due in part to 
the context of coordination. To test this, one possibility would be to independently manipulate 
the perceived effort of a partner and the degree of coordination within the joint action. Further 
research is also needed in order to investigate what other cues of a partner’s mental effort, and 
also what other forms of investment (e.g. physical effort, time and/or money), may elicit a 
sense of commitment. 
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